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by the defendant's service of a notice of appearance and demand
for a complaint, the Aversano decision appears to evidence a trend
toward a liberal construction of the statute.6 ' The precise jurisdic-
tional effect of noncompliance, however, remains uncertain. It is
hoped that future assessment of the consequences of noncompli-
ance will reflect the intentions of the draftsmen and not operate to
peremptorily deprive the plaintiff of his day in court on the merits
of his claim. Until the contours of new legislation are defined, how-
ever, the practitioner is well advised to include either the CPLR
305(b) notice or the complaint with his summons, even if default is
not anticipated.
Carl J. Laurino, Jr.
CPLR 311(1): Validity of service of process upon corporate em-
ployee upheld based on process server's reasonableness and
diligence
Under CPLR 311(1), personal service on a corporation may be
effected by delivery of a summons to a corporate official or an
"agent authorized by appointment" to receive process. In accor-
dance with the statute's purpose of giving the corporation notice of
the commencement of a suit, 3 a liberal trend has developed to ex-
61 Under the CPLR the defendant's service of a notice of appearance generally will not
operate as a waiver of the defendant's objections to personal jurisdiction so long as an objec-
tion to jurisdiction is made in a CPLR 3211(a)(8) motion or in the answer as provided by
CPLR 3211(e). CPLR 320(b).
CPLR 311 (Supp. 1980-1981) provides in pertinent part:
Personal service upon a corporation or governmental subdivision shall be
made by delivering the summons as follows: 1. upon any domestic or foreign cor-
poration, to an officer, director, managing or general agent, or cashier or assistant
cashier or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive ser-
vice ....
CPLR 311(1). The statute consolidated section 229 and parts of section 228 of the CPA and
was based upon rule 4(d)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. SECOND REP. at 161.
There was no change in substance from the CPA, SECOND RP. at 161, the main thrust of
the legislation b~ing the elimination of the previous distinctions between service of process
in domestic and foreign corporations, id.; see CPLR 311(1), commentary at 254 (1972).
Compare CPA § 228(8)-(9) with CPA § 229(3). Delivery of the summons to the Secretary of
State, under the "agent authorized by ... law" clause of CPLR 311(1), provides another
means of obtaining personal jurisdiction. This is provided for in N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§
306, 307 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1980-1981). See note 84 infra.
63 See, e.g., Fashion Page, Ltd. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 50 N.Y.2d 265, 271-72, 406 N.E.2d
747, 750, 428 N.Y.S.2d 890, 893 (1980). Notice to the corporation was also the purpose of the
predecessors of CPLR 311(1). Barrett v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 138 N.Y. 491, 493, 34
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pand its purview so that various lower level employees impliedly
authorized to receive process may also be served." In addition,
based on equitable considerations courts have been willing to vali-
date, in a few limited circumstances, service upon -individuals not
contemplated by the statute. 5 Recently, in Spacial Interiors, Ltd.
N.E. 289, 289 (1893); see Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 269-70, 115 N.E.
915, 918 (1917).
It should be noted that section 311 does not confer jurisdiction but only enumerates the
individuals upon whom process can be served. See CPLR 311, commentary at 254 (1972). It
is the positions of these individuals that "lead to a just presumption that notice to them will
be notice to the principal," thereby binding the corporation. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal
Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 269, 115 N.E. 915, 918 (1917) (citations omitted).
6 Fashion Page Ltd. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 50 N.Y.2d 265, 271, 406 N.E.2d 747, 750, 428
N.Y.S.2d 890, 893 (1980); SIEGEL § 70.
The classification "agent authorized by appointment" has not been used extensively
since it is only recently that the requirements, once considered the formal requirements set
forth in CPLR 318, have been clarified so as to permit the creation of an agency relation by
the acts or words of the employer towards his employee or a third party. See Fashion Page
Ltd. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 50 N.Y.2d 265, 272, 406 N.E.2d 747, 751, 428 N.Y.S.2d 890, 893
(1980); Sullivan Realty Organization, Inc. v. Syart Trading Corp., 68 App. Div. 2d 756, 417
N.Y.S.2d 976 (2d Dep't 1979); The Survey, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 382, 389 & n.21 (1980).
This analysis comports with the general rules of agency. See RIsTATMESN! (SEcoND) OF
AGENCY §§ 26, 27 (1958).
The majority of litigation has involved the classification of an employee as a "managing
or general agent." See The Survey, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 382, 385 n.3 (1980). The Court of
Appeals in Taylor v. Granite State Provident Ass'n, 136 N.Y. 343, 32 N.E. 992 (1893), set
out the traditional test whereby an employee must possess "general powers involving the
exercise of judgment or discretion" to qualify as a managing agent. Id. at 346, 32 N.E. at
993. This has resulted in situations where service has been held invalid due to a strict inter-
pretation of this standard. Cf. Isaf v. Pennsylvania R.R., 32 App. Div. 2d 578, 299 N.Y.S.2d
231 (3d Dep't 1969) (in freight agent's absence, acceptance of service by chief clerk held
invalid since temporary assumption of duties was insufficient to confer authority). For a
discussion of the Isaf case see The Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 313, 327-29 (1969). In a
number of cases, therefore, courts have been willing to allow exceptions to the rule so as to
effectuate justice. See note 65 infra.
65 Courts have validated service on unauthorized individuals so as to avoid inequitable
results. In Green v. Morningside Heights Hous. Corp., 13 Misc. 2d 124, 177 N.Y.S.2d 760
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), afl'd, 7 App. Div. 2d 708, 180 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1st Dep't 1958), service
was upheld when made on a corporate receptionist who delivered it to a managing agent
since the proximity in time and space between the two deliveries was such that it could "be
classified as a part of the same act." 13 Misc. 2d at 125, 177 N.Y.S.2d at 761. The Court of
Appeals indicated its approval of this decision while taking note of the process server's rea-
sonableness and diligence. McDonald v. Ames Supply Co., 22 N.Y.2d 111, 115-16, 238
N.E.2d 726, 728, 291 N.Y.S.2d 328, 332 (1968). Another equitable exception arises when the
corporation or one of its employees acts in such a way "as to give rise to a waiver and
estoppel." 1 WK&M % 311.01; see Belofatto v. Marsen Realty Corp., 62 Misc. 2d 922, 310
N.Y.S.2d 191 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1970); Buckner v. D & E Motors, Inc., 53 Misc.
2d 382, 278 N.Y.S.2d 932 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1967). Federal courts will not automatically
dismiss service upon an unauthorized individual if proper service is still possible. 2 MooRE'S
FEDERAL PRACTI 4.22 [2] (2d ed. 1980).
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v. Equitable Life Assurance Society6" and Bruce v. Prefco Corp.17
the Supreme Court, New York County, held that service upon em-
ployees concededly not authorized by statute was valid when the
process server acted with due diligence in delivering the summons
and reasonably believed that the person receiving service was au-
thorized to accept it. 68
In Spacial Interiors the summons and complaint were served
on the secretary of one defendant and on the secretary-receptionist
of another.6 9 Relying on the process server's affidavit,70 the court
noted that in both instances the employees had "held themselves
out as authorized to accept service. "71 After receipt, both secretar-
ies promptly turned the process over to the defendants.72 Simi-
larly, in Bruce, a clerk-typist accepted delivery of a summons
which she conveyed to the defendant's president.73 The clerk-typ-
ist, the sole occupant of the defendant's office at the time, accepted
the summons after the process server explained the purpose of his
visit and inquired as to her authority to accept process. 4 In each
of these cases, the supreme court denied the defendant's motion to
Service has generally been invalidated, however, when made upon an individual not
enumerated in the statute even though there was a subsequent delivery to a proper party.
See, e.g., McDonald v. Ames Supply Co., 22 N.Y.2d 111, 238 N.E.2d 726, 291 N.Y.S.2d 328
(1968); see Boser v. Burdick, 62 App. Div. 2d 1134, 404 N.Y.S.2d 187 (4th Dep't 1978). This
was true with respect to the CPA also. See Commissioners of State Ins. Fund v. Singer
Sewing Mach. Co., 281 App. Div. 867, 119 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1st Dep't 1953).
11 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 18, 1980, at 6, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. New York County).
17 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 12, 1980, at 5, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. New York County).
" N.Y.L.J., Nov. 18, 1980, at 6, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. New York County); N.Y.L.J., Nov. 12,
1980, at 5, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. New York County).
19 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 18, 1980, at 6, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. New York County). The plaintiffs,
subtenants in a New York City building, brought an action to recover for water damage to
their property. They charged the defendants with negligence which caused plumbing and
heating pipes in their building to rupture. Id.
70 Since the process server had retired and moved out of the state, he was not available
to testify. Id. The court, therefore, had to consider his affidavit as to "the papers served, the
person served, the date, the time, the address and manner of service." Id. The affidavit was
available to the court due to the compliance with CPLR 306 which sets forth the necessary
requirements for proof of service. See CPLR 306 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
7' N.Y.L.J., Nov. 18, 1980, at 6, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. New York County). The employees
submitted affidavits, however, averring that they were not qualified to accept service. Id.
72 Id.
7' N.Y.L.J., Nov. 12, 1980, at 5, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. New York County). Conveyance to
defendant's president took place within one-half hour of the service. Id. The plaintiff in the
action was a tenant in a building owned by the defendant corporation. He brought a per-
sonal injury suit when a portion of a ceiling fell on him. Id.
74 Id.
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dismiss.7 5
Initially, both supreme court decisions emphasized that the
statutory purpose of notice to the corporation had been fulfilled.76
In addition, both courts relied upon the Court of Appeals decision
in Fashion Page, Ltd. v. Zurich Insurance Co."7 wherein the Court
indicated, in dicta, that a corporate defendant will usually be es-
topped from claiming lack of personal jurisdiction when an em-
ployee not encompassed by the statute assumes to accept process.7 8
Moreover, the Fashion Page Court suggested that the controlling
factors in such instances are the reasonableness and due diligence
of the process server.79 Thus, in Spacial Interiors, Justice Ascione
opined that service was valid since proper inquiry had been made
and process had been served on the "person apparently in charge
of defendant's office."80 Similarly, Justice Kirschenbaum upheld
" N.Y.L.J., Nov. 18, 1980, at 6, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. New York County); N.Y.L.J., Nov. 12,
1980, at 5, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. New York County). Defendants' motions for dismissal were made
pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) (8) and claimed lack of personal jurisdiction over the corporation.
Id.
I 6 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 18, 1980, at 6, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. New York County); N.Y.L.J., Nov. 12,
1980, at 5, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. New York County); see note 63 supra.
7 50 N.Y.2d 265, 406 N.E.2d 747, 428 N.Y.S.2d 890 (1980).
78 Id. at 273-74, 406 N.E.2d at 751-52, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 894. In Fashion Page, the Court
of Appeals upheld the validity of service made upon an executive secretary of a foreign
corporation. The process server had informed a receptionist that he had to serve a summons
and complaint and inquired as to whom he could see. The receptionist directed him down a
hall and told him to "'see the girl sitting down there."' Id. at 269, 406 N.E.2d at 749, 428
N.Y.S.2d at 892. Upon doing this, he encountered an individual who was, in fact, the vice-
president's secretary. After informing her of the purpose of his visit, he inquired as to her
authority to accept service. She assured him she could take the summons and complaint. Id.
at 270, 406 N.E.2d at 749, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 892. Upon the vice-president's return to the
office, she informed him of her receipt of service. He told her to forward it to the corpora-
tion's legal department. Id. The Court noted that for at least 5 years she had accepted
service without objection from the corporation whenever the vice president was absent from
the office. Id.
In its holding, the Court noted the liberal criteria that should be used when making a
determination of whether an agency authorized by appointment had been created. See note
86 infra. It would appear, therefore, as was pointed out by Judge Gabrielli in his concurring
opinion, that under the facts of Fashion Page, the executive secretary was an impliedly
authorized agent capable of accepting process within the meaning of CPLR 311(1). 50
N.Y.2d at 276, 406 N.E.2d at 753, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 895 (Gabrielli, J., concurring). The Court
went further, however, and noted that in most office-setting situations where a process
server acts reasonably and with due diligence, a corporation will be bound by service ac-
cepted by unauthorized employees who have misrepresented their power. Id. at 274, 406
N.E.2d at 752, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
"' See note 78 supra.
1o N.Y.L.J., Nov. 18, 1980, at 6, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. New York County). Justice Ascione
misinterpreted the facts in Fashion Page when he stated that the Court of Appeals had
upheld service made on "a receptionist, concededly not authorized," id., since the Court had
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the validity of service in Bruce based upon the process server's due
diligence and the representation of authority by the employee. 1
It appears that the Spacial Interiors and Bruce courts prop-
erly used the reasonableness and due diligence dicta of Fashion
Page to prevent corporate defendants from using technical defi-
ciencies as a shield against service of process.2 It is submitted,
however, that with respect to validating service upon unauthorized
individuals, the application of Fashion Page should be limited to
situations such as those presented by Spacial Interiors and Bruce
in which an employee in an office setting, upon direct inquiry, mis-
represents his authority to accept service.88 Indeed, a broader in-
held that this receptionist had been impliedly authorized by appointment to accept service,
50 N.Y.2d at 271-72, 406 N.E.2d at 750-51, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
81 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 12, 1980, at 5, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. New York County).
82 Both Spacial Interiors and Bruce involve an office setting where a corporate em-
ployee has misrepresented his authority to accept a summons. This appears to be the situa-
tion addressed by the Fashion Page dicta. See note 78 supra. See also Belofatto v. Marsen
Realty Corp.,'62 Misc. 2d 922, 924, 310 N.Y.S.2d 191, 193 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1970). It is possible, however, that the Court, in Fashion Page, was addressing its discussion
about reasonableness and diligence to the situation when a summons is delivered to an em-
ployee impliedly authorized to accept service. The Court first noted the importance of the
process server's ability to rely on corporate employees while discussing "alternative proce-
dures" used by corporations. 50 N.Y.2d at 272, 406 N.E.2d at 751, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 893. Both
Spacial Interiors and Bruce, therefore, may be outside the scope of the Court of Appeals
decision in Fashion Page.
Nevertheless, it is apparent that an equitable result has been achieved in both cases.
This was clearly the case in Spacial Interiors, wherein the defendant waited until after the
statute of limitations had run to make known the alleged defects in service. N.Y.L.J., Nov.
18, 1980, at 6, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. New York County). Indeed, since the Spacial Interiors deci-
sion is in accord with prior decisions in which courts have been willing to apply an estoppel
or waiver when the corporation or its employees act improperly, see Fashion Page, Ltd. v.
Zurich Ins. Co., 50 N.Y.2d 265, 274-75, 406 N.E.2d 747, 752, 428 N.Y.S.2d 890, 895 (1980)
(Gabrielli, J., concurring); note 65 supra, it is quite possible that the plaintiffs would not
have gone remediless if the case law prior to Fashion Page had been applied. See note 65
supra.
83 Fashion Page's application should be limited since the imposition of fault upon the
corporation for the misrepresentations of its employees, 50 N.Y.2d at 274, 406 N.E.2d at
752, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 894, is in contradiction with the agency law upon which CPLR 311(1)
must be based, see CPLR 311(1), commentary at 129 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). Al-
though a principal may create an agency relation expressly or impliedly, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 26 (1958), he will not be bound by misrepresentations of authority by
one not authorized, absent some type of estoppel caused by the circumstances, see id., § 8B,
or ratification of the act by the principal, see id., § 82. In addition, the presence of an
employee in an office should not equate with a manifestation by the employer that this
individual is authorized to accept process. See id., § 8. See generally Sullivan Realty Organ-
ization, Inc. v. Syart Trading Corp., 68 App. Div. 2d 756, 769-70, 417 N.Y.S.2d 976, 984-85
(2d Dep't 1979) (Damiani, J.P., dissenting). It has also been suggested that in redelivering
the summons and complaint to the corporate official, the unauthorized employee is acting as
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terpretation, placing greater emphasis on notice to the corporation
than on the process server's reasonableness and diligence, would
undermine the statutory scheme set forth by the legislature . 4
Clearly, service cannot be upheld when the sole basis for validation
is notice to the corporation. s5
Furthermore, a determination that an individual is an "agent
authorized by appointment" is more easily obtainable after Fash-
ion Page wherein the Court held that it is not necessary to fulfill
any formal requirements in order to create this agency relation-
ship.8 It is suggested, therefore, that the interests of plaintiffs
such as those in Spacial Interiors and Bruce could be better
served if it can be shown that the corporate employee given the
summons has been impliedly authorized as an agent to accept ser-
vice.87 Validity of service accompanies such a showing and elimi-
an agent of the process server. See CPLR 308, commentary at 205 (1972).
64 One reason for limiting service to those situations covered by CPLR 311(1) is to
prevent the proliferation of careless service which results in unnecessary litigation. See
Fashion Page, Ltd. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 50 N.Y.2d 265, 275, 406 N.E.2d 747, 752, 428 N.Y.S.2d
890, 895-96 (1980) (Gabrielli, J., concurring); Farrell, Civil Practice, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 15,
31-35 (1980). It would seem wise to limit the exceptions to this section to those situations
where it is necessary in order to bring about a just result. Additionally, it has been held that
the substituted service methods of CPLR 308 may not be used with respect to corporations.
SIGEL § 70; see Melendez v. Sharet Realty Corp., N.Y.L.J., Nov. 15, 1963, at 16, col. 2 (Sup.
Ct. Bronx County). The hardships imposed on plaintiffs due to this strict interpretation,
however, are not as great as they may first appear. A plaintiff has the option of serving
process on the Secretary of State who is considered the agent of the corporation. See N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 306 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1980-1981) (service of process on domestic
and authorized foreign corporations); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 307 (McKinney 1963 & Supp.
1980-1981) (service of process on unauthorized foreign corporation). The advantages of this
method of service include the avoidance of unnecessary litigation concerning the validity of
service. See Farrell supra, at 31.
11 See 50 N.Y.2d at 273, 406 N.E.2d at 751, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 894. The Fashion Page
Court noted that basing validity of service on notice to the corporation would only en-
courage carelessness. Id; see McDonald v. Ames Supply Co., 22 N.Y.2d 111, 116, 238 N.E.2d
726, 728-29, 291 N.Y.S.2d 328, 332 (1968).
86 50 N.Y.2d at 272, 406 N.E.2d at 751, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 893. In Fashion Page, the
Court of Appeals held that a corporation need not comply with the formalities of CPLR 318
in order to appoint an agent authorized to accept service. Id. In doing so the Court noted
that this would prevent the corporation from avoiding the natural consequences of its ac-
tions. Id. In the area of service of process, therefore, the corporation will be bound by the
common-law principles of agency and will be responsible for both the express and implied
agencies created by its actions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 26 (1958).
87 In neither Spacial Interiors, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 18, 1980, at 6, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. New York
County), nor Bruce, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 12, 1980, at 5, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. New York County), did
the supreme court ascertain whether the employees had previously accepted service of pro-
cess. Had the courts found such prior activity, validity of service could have been based
upon an implied agency relationship. See note 86 supra.
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nates a determination based upon ill-defined standards of reason-
ableness and due diligence.8 8 In addition, service upon an
individual contemplated by the statute raises a presumption of no-
tice to the corporation. The benefit of this presumption does not
inure to the plaintiff who serves an unauthorized employee.90 It
seems advisable, therefore, that further expansive construction of
the statute should be curtailed.91
Eugene G. Reynolds
CPLR 311(1) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). The Fashion Page Court noted that the
determination of the reasonableness and due diligence of the process server must be made
on a case-by-case basis. 50 N.Y.2d at 273, 406 N.E.2d at 751, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 894. The
Court also stated that it would not be reasonable for a process server to rely on the repre-
sentations of a corporate employee in all instances. Id. This was pointed out to be especially
true if occurring outside the office setting. Id. The Court, however, did not specify any cir-
cumstances within the office setting where service would be invalidated on the basis of a
lack of due diligence. The test remains a subjective and, therefore, nebulous one and valid-
ity of service cannot be assured. Cf. Barnes v. City of New York, 70 App. Div. 2d 580, 416
N.Y.S.2d 52 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 48 N.Y.2d 630, 396 N.E.2d 475, 421 N.Y.S.2d 193
(1979) (insufficient due diligence to permit alternative service on individual even though
process server visited residence on 4 separate days).
A statutory presumption of notice to the corporation accompanies service upon an
individual enunciated in CPLR 311(1). Fashion Page, Ltd. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 50 N.Y.2d at
272, 406 N.E.2d at 750, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
so When service upon an unauthorized employee is upheld, validation is based upon the
process server's actions and not the position of the individual receiving process. See note 78
supra. A presumption of notice to the corporation will not arise in this situation since the
basis for this presumption is the position of the corporate official enunciated in CPLR
311(1). See note 63 supra.
Notice to the corporation will be a significant factor if the person upon whom service is
made fails to inform the corporation and a default judgment is entered. In order to have this
default judgment vacated, the corporation will have to rely on either CPLR 317 or CPLR
5015(a)(1). See SIEGEL § 108. To obtain relief under CPLR 317 a defendant has the burden
of showing lack of knowledge. 1 WK&M 317.07. Similarly, CPLR 5015(a)(1) requires a
defendant to show excusable error on his part in order to obtain relief. 5 WK&M 1 5015.04.
In both instances, therefore, a corporate defendant will have to show that notice was never
received. When service of process has complied with CPLR 311(1) the presumption of notice
will have to be rebutted by the corporation. A defendant will not be forced to overcome this
obstacle if service is not in accord with the statute.
91 See Fashion Page, Ltd. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 50 N.Y.2d at 275, 406 N.E.2d at 753, 428
N.Y.S.2d at 895 (Gabrielli, J., concurring).
